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ABSTRACT 
Throughout the early nineties, the Navy has downsized in an unprecedented manner 
primarily as a result of the end of the Cold War era. An initial analysis of how 
such downsizing measures have occurred within the Department of the Navy is 
undertaken by studying the Headquarters Department of Naval Sea Systems 
Command (NAVSEA). As the largest naval shore command, much valuable 
information can be extracted for possible guidance to other commands and military 
officers attempting to further reduce their organizational structure. A model of 
public sector force reduction decisions is introduced to provide a basis for 
comparison and  to facilitate learning from NAVSEA Headquarters' experiences. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A.  THE THESIS 
During 1991-1993, NAVSEA Headquarters has downsized 
repeatedly primarily due to personnel and budget cuts, plus 
DoD- and Navy-directed reorganization requirements. As the 
largest Naval Command, with an excess of 4,000 military and 
civilian employees, a diagnosis of their downsizing 
methodology will provide insight on downsizing for other Naval 
and DoD commands. 
With future DoD budget cuts forecasted as a result of 
actions by Congress, there are no Naval commands exempt from 
future budget reductions. How these commands might implement 
the necessary reductions remains to be seen. With limited 
guidance to facilitate decision-making processes, any "tool" 
that provides greater clarity will benefit the Navy. 
One possible "tool" is Jones' model of fiscal stress 
responses which discusses "the manner in which public 
organizations recognize and attempt to manage financial crises 
and prolonged financial stress." The foundation of the model 
lies in three basic assumptions:1 
1
 L. R. Jones and Glen C. Bixler, Mission Financing to 
Realign National Defense.'JAI Press, Inc., 1992, p. 48. 
1. Public organizations employ four non-mutually exclusive 
responses in managing fiscal stress: 
• across-the-board reduction; 
• specific program reduction; 
• program termination; and 
• program reorganization and consolidation or merger. 
2. Significant centralization of authority characterizes 
restraint responses. 
3. Organizational "smoothing" of reduction over a multiyear 
period accommodates fiscal restraint more effectively than 
quick cuts. 
B.  OBJECTIVE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis will document and analyze the downsizing of 
NAVSEASYSCOM Headquarters using as a base of comparison the 
model provided in "Phases of Recognition and Management of 
Financial Crisis in public Organization" by L.R. Jones. The 
central focus of this thesis is to describe how NAVSEA 
Headquarters has implemented budget cuts and to ascertain 
whether their actions in downsizing parallel the outcomes 
predicted by the Jones model. This will be accomplished by 
studying various command data and comparing them to the model. 
As Executive and Congressional budget cuts will continue 
to force reductions upon Naval commands, activity Commanders 
need viable information and/or "tools" at their disposal to 
accommodate change. Documenting the downsizing of the largest 
Naval Command in comparison to a "model" might help meet this 
need. 
C.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research questions are: 
• Does NAVSEA Headquarters' downsizing parallel that of the 
Jones model? If not, what alternate decision process was 
implemented? 
• Were drawdown decisions made by central authority? 
• Were "Across-The-Board" or a "Reduction in Targeted 
Services Programs" or a combination of both implemented? 
Subsidiary research questions include the following: 
• How has NAVSEA Headquarters organizational structure 
(departments and people) changed as a result of budget 
cuts from 1991 to 1993? 
• How were  billets  eliminated--by attrition  or other 
methodology? 
• Did  NAVSEA  develop  a  long  term  POA&M  for  its 
organizational restructure before or after downsizing? 
• Does the Jones model provide potential guidance for DoD 
activities to effectively utilize in drawdown decisions? 
• What notable discrepancies are not addressed by the model? 
D.  SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This thesis will primarily discuss the downsizing of the 
Headquarters department within NAVSEA and its affiliated 
Program Executive Officers (PEOs) and Direct Reporting Program 
Managers  (DRPMs)    due  to  the  massive  organizational 
responsibilities that are involved. There will be some 
command-wide information dispersed throughout to provide 
greater clarity of the impact that Headquarters downsizing 
generates. 
By no means does this thesis purport to document every 
restructuring change that Headquarters experienced from 1991 
through 1993, only the significant ones as obtained from the 
data collected. It is acknowledged that this department has 
continued to downsize, and more downsizing is predicted in 
future years according to their force reduction plans. 
Lastly, it is assumed that the reader is generally 
familiar with the concept of Total Quality Management (TQM) or 
Leadership (TQL) in relation to Navy practices and doctrines. 
E.  THESIS OUTLINE 
The remainder of this thesis is divided into four 
chapters. The second chapter will provide a composite 
literature review on downsizing overall followed by 
Congressional restrictions imposed upon the Department of 
Defense and the Navy in particular. Some of the Navy's 
cutback management decisions and force reductions are 
elaborated with implications of the impact to society. 
The third chapter will set the stage for understanding 
NAVSEA's missions and functions followed by what Headquarters 
did or planned to do in complying with Navy's downsizing 
mandates. NAVSEA's strategic objectives and actions will be 
detailed with respect to its Headquarters' Department. 
The fourth chapter will compare the downsizing actions 
undertaken by NAVSEA Headquarters (as discussed in Chapter 
III) to the Jones model. 
The final chapter will answer the primary and subsidiary 
questions, discuss brief managerial strategies for future 
reductions, identify the current position and future 
forecasts of NAVSEA's planned reductions, and offer 
recommendations for future study. 
II.  DOWNSIZING CONCEPTS AND DON'S IMPACT 
A.  DOWNSIZING DEFINED AND DISCUSSED 
Before delving into what the Department of the Navy (DON) 
did in order to effect its downsizing targets, it is necessary 
to first recognize and then define this modern-day activity, 
understanding that it is not a new phenomenon. 
Current terminology or phrases label the occasion of work 
force reductions due to economic contraction or cutback 
management as: 




5. Transition management 
6. De-cruitment 
7. Deorganization.2 
This is not an exhaustive list. The diversity of these 
descriptive terms indicates that there is no universally 
acknowledged terminology or language to define the evolution 
Steve W. J. Kozlowski, et al. , Oraaniz^inn^l 
Downsizing: Individual and Organisational Implications anH 
Recommendations for Action, Michigan State University  June 
occurring today. "Some convergence is evidenced, however, 
among the organizational theory, organizational psychology, 
and management  literature."3 
This multi-faceted phenomenon called downsizing is the 
elimination of employment positions and "is not necessarily 
limited to the lowest levels of management."4 A build-down 
can "occur by reducing work (not just employees) as well as by 
eliminating functions, hierarchial levels, or units" to 
streamline the business operations. It "does not include the 
discharge of individuals for cause, or individual departures 
via  normal   retirement  or  resignations."5 
There are many organizational advantages to downsizing 
espoused with increasing overall effectiveness as a primary 
goal.      Some  other  expected  consequences  are:6 
♦Lower overhead; 
*Less  bureaucracy; 
♦Faster decision making; 
♦Smoother  communications; 
♦Greater entrepreneurship;    ■
♦Increases   in productivity. 
"Retrenchment and downsizing have become such pervasive 
and prevalent activities that theorists now regard these 
3
 Ibid., p. 3. 
4
 Ibid., p. 1. 
5
 Wayne F. Cascio, "Downsizing: What do we know? What 




processes as a normal part of the life cycle of 
organizations."7 This life cycle of demassing consists of 
four phases: "creation, growth, decline, and possibly death" 
(of the firm).8 With the advent of numerous organizational 
changes, many agencies begin downsizing without a plan or 
policy as a foundation thereby disrupting their normal life 
cycle. They merely react to economic pressures (the bottom 
line or profits) such as "global competition, technological 
innovation, political change, resource scarcity and shrinking 
revenues"9 or other demands, by haphazardly implementing 
various cuts to obtain short-term benefits. Such impromptu 
actions by management disregard the massive disturbances in 
organizational relationships that result as a by-product of 
change.10 
Managers have a choice to be proactive or reactive before 
mandatory downsizing happens in their domain. If they are 
attuned to their operating environment or market shifts, 
changes in consumer demands, funding inadequacies or decreased 
profits, then supervisors can formulate an advanced plan of 
action (proactive approach) rather than reacting with a "quick 
fix" when the crisis is upon them. 
7






 Cascio, op. cit., p. 98. 
8 
When managers are faced with the prospects of downsizing, 
several personnel reduction strategies are available. One 
suggested remedy for easing the pain of a RIF is to include 
employees early in all of the planning stages of demassing 
rather than thrusting it upon them at a moment's notice. 
Allowing their inputs into eliminating billets fosters mutual 
understanding of the critical impacts of the downsizing and 
keeps communication channels open. 
Other RIF strategies can be distinguished as "less 
intrusive" and "more intrusive." The less intrusive reduction 
strategies include: "natural attrition, reduced recruitment 
and accessions, and maximization of voluntary separations and 
early retirements." The more intrusive reduction tactics 
include involuntary separations or other direct approaches.11 
Such strategies can be "hiearchially arranged or sequenced 
with respect to their impacts on employee well-being versus 
short-term cost savings."12 
The organizational culture or climate may play a vital 
role in the decision to eliminate certain positions or release 
targeted personnel. Culture, the "totality of what is learned 
by the individuals as members of society,"13 in a given place 
11
 Kozlowski, op. cit., p. x. 
12
 Ibid. , p. viii. 
13
 Charles Coates and Rolland J. Pellegrin, Military 
Sociology:  A Study of American Military Institutions and 
Military Life." University Park, Maryland, 1965, p. 7. 
or time, includes knowledge, beliefs and customs. Research 
has shown that culture is an intangible asset of a firm when 
it is positively perceived and supported. Thus, if the 
military implements a RIF, not only does that "status quo" 
change, but the working environment becomes unstable and 
potentially tumultuous. 
Transition management "has exploded the myth of job 
security, and has accelerated employee mobility...[and] 
fundamentally altered the terms of the psychological contract 
that binds workers to organizations."14 The previous era'of 
company loyalty is absent as surviving personnel now fear and 
distrust the leaders given excessive uncertainty over job 
stability. "There's no certainty in the traditional ethics of 
work hard, move up in the company and you get more salary and 
benefits."15 Now there are corporate mergers to contend with 
thereby increasing environmental stress in the work place. 
"Study after study shows that following a downsizing, 
surviving employees become narrow-minded, self-absorbed, and 
risk averse. Morale sinks, productivity drops, and survivors 
distrust management." These adjectives form the definition of 
"survivors' syndrome."16 
14
 Cascio, op. cit., p. 103. 
15
 Fabio Santiago, "Workers feel pressured by change," 
San Jose Mercury News. August 14, 1994, pp. lpc-2pc. 
16 Cascio, op.cit., p. 100 
10 
Understanding the employees who are in the "survivors' 
syndrome" is an important managerial function. With hiring 
freezes as "the first measure traditionally employed to cope 
with a reduction in resources,...the most skilled will move'on 
at greater frequency than [the] least skilled."17 This is due 
to the lack of promotion opportunities and benefits in the 
midst of increased responsibilities. Thus, the survivors will 
be the least skilled with no managerial recourse to bring in 
the requisite expertise because of the freeze. The resultant 
increase in these employees' personal stress levels or 
decreased morale can ' not be dismissed lightly if 
organizational effectiveness is to be realized. 
With greater emphasis on TQM in most businesses today, 
including the military, a key ingredient necessary to sustain 
TQM programs is high morale. For TQM to be effective, the 
employees must align themselves with management's plan towards 
higher quality goods and services. A disgruntled employee 
with low morale is NOT fully productive or concerned with 
TQM.18 
With transition management comes the advent of greater 
technology and opportunities for success--and failures. With 
many   white-collar   workers   eliminated   during   the 
17
 James Crawford Cox, Gramm-Rudman, Proposition 13. 
and Cutback Management. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA, 1986, p. 35. 
18
 Cascio, op. cit., p. 101. 
11 
reorganization, many line employees are expected to perform 
the managerial functions at the same rate of pay and use 
advanced technology simultaneously. Most of these line 
employees have little experience in setting performance goals, 
maintaining a departmental budget, or forecasting future 
requirements. The same applies to Navy personnel as the mid- 
grade officer and enlisted ranks have been trimmed 
significantly since 1990, leaving junior personnel with the 
equivalent challenge of rising to the occasion. 
B.  DOWNSIZING AND THE MILITARY 
The end of the 2 0th century finds the United States 
reexamining the very purpose of its military forces and 
redefining the role of the nation as the world's sole 
superpower. At the same time, in the midst of a defense 
drawdown, the environment for staffing the military forces 
is rapidly changing: new missions, new conflicts, new 
people, new pressures, new mood, no money.19 
Looking retrospectively at the military's downsizing 
efforts, "the past demobilizations were primarily concerned 
with the separation of volunteers or draftees" who joined the 
military to fight for this country engaged in war. 
Consequently, with the advent of peace, they were ready to 
return to civilian status. However, the "present all- 
volunteer  force  was  not  drafted,  was  not recruited for 
19
 Mark J. Eitelberg, "The All-Volunteer Force After 
Twenty Years," presented at the U. S. Naval Academy, 
Annapolis, Maryland, September 1993, p. 31. 
12 
a specific conflict," and is not necessarily eager to exit the 
military. 20 
Today's All-Volunteer Force (AVF) developed vigorously 
throughout the Cold War era. The military was widely seen "as 
having received preferential treatment during the first half 
of the 198 0s when the annual defense budget mushroomed from 
$144 billion to $295 billion."21 During this time, President 
Reagan was in office overseeing the Navy's build-up for a 
massive 600 ship Navy to patrol the high seas. This expensive 
expansion greatly increased the federal deficit as Congress 
was unable to align expenses with revenues. As a result, the 
Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Bills (1985 and 1987) were legislated to 
force Congress to manage the federal budget within specified 
spending targets with the ultimate goal of a zero deficit by 
FY91.22 
Goldwater-Nichols act led to military jointness or 
consolidation of many like functions to generate fiscal 
savings such as: commissaries; finance systems; procurement 
processes; research and development functions; and maintenance 
operations.23 
20
 Kozlowski, loc. cit. 
21
 Eitelberg, op. cit., p. 25. 
22
 Allen Schick, The Capacity to Budget. Washington, 
D.C., 1990, pp. 4-6. 
23 Eitelberg, op. cit., p. 26 
13 
Gramm-Rudman specified that when implementing 
sequestration (deficit reduction), the President must trim 
"each program, project, or activity (PPA) within a budget 
account by the same percentage." Also, all PPAs appropriated 
each year must be specified in the annual appropriations 
bill.24 This precludes any accounting maneuvers by DOD to hide 
PPAs from Congressional cuts. Only eligible non-defense and 
defense accounts (approximately 30 percent of the federal 
budget) are candidates for sequestration so drastic fiscal 
reductions carry significant weight. 
Thus, the rightsizing of the military actually started 
with the Reagan military buildup that helped bankrupt the 
former Soviet Union, which ultimately ended the Cold War.25 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the primary military 
threat was removed and the American taxpayer began to expect 
a decrease in defense spending and consequently in the federal 
deficit. By 1987, the downsizing "was based much on budgetary 
factors as on the diminishing risk of global conflict."26 
The Navy's 600 ship fleet was a primary target in the 
Secretary of Defense's infrastructure reduction plans in the 
24
 Cox, op. cit., pp. 13-15. 
25
 Ernest Blazer, "The Incredible Shrinking Navy," Navy 
Times, September 19, 1994, p. 13. 
26
 Eitelberg, op. cit., p. 8. 
14 
mid-eighties. Several cutbacks were identified to include the 
following:27 
• The fleet would be reduced to 580 ships; 
• Poseidon submarines were scheduled for retirement in 
conjunction with the arrival of new Trident subs; 
• A scheduled nuclear submarine overhaul was eliminated as 
the vessel was retired; 
• Sixteen frigates were marked for retirement; 
• The 14th Navy air wing was cut. 
Furthermore, "the appropriate mix of ships within the 
fleet was not achieved and the degree of fleet modernization 
desired was sacrificed." Some 9,600 personnel cuts 
accompanied these force reductions, too, in anticipation of 
reducing 1989s manpower expenditures in the budget. Many- 
program and weapon system terminations were slated for the 
1989 budget to include the A-6F aircraft and two torpedoes: 
the MK-4 8 and MK-50.28 
C.  NAVY'S INFRASTRUCTURE POST 1990 
Apart from questions over hardware and money, there is the 
question of just what the nation expects the Navy and its 
people to do in the post-Cold War world.29 
27




 Blazer, loc. cit. 
15 
In a news article called "The Incredible Shrinking Navy," 
the announcement is made that "for the first time in 55 years, 
the United States Navy will have fewer than 4 00 ships" once 
the USS Dale is retired on September 22, 1994.30 This is the 
result of numerous cutbacks and fiscal limitations imposed by 
Congress on the Department of the Navy (DON). 
During September 1993, the Department of Defense (DoD) 
announced its "Bottom-Up Review" as the plan for America's 
future. This doctrine serves as the Pentagon's "official 
blueprint for strategy and force structure." President 
Clinton and "his first defense secretary, Les Aspin, promised 
the Bottom-Up Review would provide the basis for the first 
post Cold-War consensus about the size, shape and costs of the 
military."31 For the Navy, this plan calls for a twelve 
carrier fleet with 100 percent capability to fight two wars at 
the same time. There was (and continues to be) much 
discussion over the validity of this plan primarily due to 
cost concerns. "The one issue on which everyone agrees is 
that there is too little money in the budgets planned for the 





 William Matthews, "Leaks in the Bottom-Up," Navy 




DoD figures that the subsequent annual budgets through 
1999 are short by an estimated $11 billion if the Bottom-Up 
Review is to be funded in full and will exceed $3 7 billion if 
military and civilian pay raises are authorized by Congress. 
Other non-DoD analysts estimate a $100 billion shortfall. The 
Navy adamantly maintains that it will suffer a loss of $14 
billion not to mention the lack of investment in new weapon 
systems or surface platforms. "In 1995, for example, the 
administration proposes to build six Navy ships, fewer than a 
third of the 20 bought in 1990. "33 
Defense Secretary William Perry supports the 
Administration's Bottom-Up Review, citing that the downsizing 
enables the Navy to select the best from unused equipment, 
given fewer sailors who need it. He calls this salvaging a 
"modernization effect" that internalizes a "procurement 
holiday" in the overall plan. Nonetheless, the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) concurs with critics that more "ships, 
planes and tanks than are included in the administration's 
procurement plan would be needed to sustain its forces in a 
steady state."34 
The Pentagon initially maintains that recoupment of monies 
from base closures is the best way to make the Bottom-Up 




 Ibid, p. 31. 
17 
closures which took place in 1990 and 1993. The Navy, fully- 
supportive, "targeted 23 major bases to shut and 25 minor ones 
to close or be realigned" beyond 1993. It plans to use the 
savings to cover the costs of "building three Arleigh Burke- 
class destroyers a year, a new LPD-17 class of amphibious 
assault ships to replace three classes of amphibious ships and 
a new attack submarine."35 
Now, there is a lack of conviction in the Pentagon's 
belief. What was once viewed as the key ingredient in 
obtaining savings under the Bottom-Up Review by the 
Administration now makes Pentagon officials anxious to delay 
any closures. It is not "politically correct" or career 
enhancing to drastically handicap numerous military 
communities with base closures at one time--especially with 
federal elections on the 1996 horizon. The Navy insists upon 
their closures as there is no other way to accumulate the 
economic resources needed to maintain an infrastructure no 
longer needed. In any event, there are proposals on the floor 
to change the law in order to delay the 1995 base closures 
until 1997.36 
Subsequently, without any recoupment of funds, the Navy 
realizes that it "would have to cut force structure below the 
35
 Ibid, p. 10. 
36
 Ibid. 
levels set" equating to 16 fewer ships than the 346 approved. 
Assistant Defense Secretary Edward Warner purports that a 33 0- 
ship Navy is "able to sustain the overseas presence" required, 
given that the plan is accommodating to changing missions.37 
Adm. Jeremy (Mike) Boorda, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), 
states that he wants the drawdown to stop at 346 ships despite 
congressional plans of 330 or less. He says that "we have not 
had this few ships in the U.S. Navy since 193 9."38 
The Pentagon continues planning its 25 percent military 
reduction slated between 1990 and 1995.39 In the 1991 Defense 
Authorization Bill, Congress set the prioritized mechanisms 
for demassing as: 
1. Reduction in new accessions 
2. Reductions in retirement eligible members 
3. Control entry into the career force. 
These targets applied to officers and enlisted personnel in 
order to meet annual end-strengths. Each fiscal year, 
"Congress appropriates a military manpower budget for the 
37
 Ibid, p. 31. 
38
 Blazer, loc. cit 
39
 James Kitfield, "Blacks in the Military," Government 
Executive. February 1994, p. 31. 
19 
Navy, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense specifies a 
limit on the total number of personnel by grade."40 
Given this mission, the Navy established its drawdown 
philosophy after considering the environmental elements that 
could affect any planned actions. In 1989, there was a stable 
environment presumed and relatively steady retention rates 
observed. However, as time passed, retention increased to a 
post-Vietnam-era high, possibly due to a sluggish economy. As 
a result, mandatory Congressional end strengths cuts were 
dictated. Keeping forefront the pledges to preserve the mid- 
career force by not involuntarily separating them and to 
continue providing all pay entitlement including incentive 
programs directed at retention, the Navy promulgated its 
strategies to maintain its organizational readiness.41 
One of the first drawdown strategies dictated that 
personnel reductions be tied to corresponding cuts in the 
infrastructure--ships, bases, and squadrons. This matching of 
reductions assured a balance of billets and ratings to prevent 
keeping overmanned ratings at the expense of critical ones and 
assisted in meeting required end-strengths. 
40
 R. L. Boiler, R. K. Lehto and J. Offir, "Design and 
Use of A Force Structure Simulation Model," Time Studies, 
1978, p. 175. 
41
 Data obtained via BUPERS, PERS 2, presentation 
slides, author unknown, on March 24, 1994 at Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS). 
20 
The number of enlisted accessions from FY89 to FY94 also 







In a mere six years, enlisted accessions dropped 38,974. From 
1990 to 1993, the period that NAVSEA Headquarters implements 
its transition management strategies, the drop is 11,525. 
Figure 2 depicts the historical relationship between the 
Navy's number of ships and total active duty end-strength 
through 1999 forecasts. Over time, the number of ships drop 
rapidly in relation to the number of personnel starting with 
slightly less than 1,300 vessels and 1,200,00 people in 1946 
to slightly more than 400 ships and 400,000 sailors in 1993. 
This represents approximately a 70 percent cut in ship 
quantity and a 67 percent slash in military end strength. 
Actual statistics for the numbers of ships, active duty 
Navy staff, and civilians from FY89 to FY94 with projections 




Another strategy, pertaining to overmanned year groups, 
dictates that, as senior paygrades were reduced, so were 
junior billets at the same shrinkage rate. Keeping the best 
possible experience mix was the major emphasis in these 
initiatives .42 
During July 1994, RADM Henry C. McKinney, Deputy Chief of 
Naval Personnel, communicated various Navy manpower 
strategies.  Some of them were: 
1. By 1999 the active duty Navy will be reduced by 170,000 
enlisted, 20,000 officers, 200 ships and 1,500 aircraft. 
2. The Navy will provide the maximum possible stability for 
careerists, including no involuntary, mid-career 
separations. 
3. Maintain high standards for quality of life for Navy 
families .43 
The Navy Drawdown Profile from FY 89 to FY 99 is shown in 
Figure l.44 From this diagram, the Navy shows a steady 
personnel decline from a total strength of 592,700 in FY89 to 
510,900 in FY93 with few numbers in all three categories-- 
Officers, Enlisted and Midshipmen (Midn). There are 150,600 




 The Graduate Newsletter, National Naval Officers 
Association, Monterey Chapter, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, California, September 1994, p. 1. 
44
 Data obtained via BUPERS, PERS 2, lecture and 
presentation, author unknown, on March 24, 1994 at NPS. 
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Figure 1.  Navy Drawdown Profile 
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The number of enlisted accessions from FY89 to FY94 also 
portrays the severity of the Navy's RIF as shown below.45 
1989 94, 674 
1990 73, 893 
1991 71, 108 
1992 59, 433 
1993 62, 368 
1994 55, 700 
In a mere six years, enlisted accessions dropped 38,974. From 
1990 to 1993, the period that NAVSEA Headquarters implements 
its transition management strategies, the drop is 11,525. 
Figure 2 depicts the historical relationship between the 
Navy's number of ships and total active duty end-strength 
through 1999 forecasts. Over time, the number of ships drop 
rapidly in relation to the number of personnel starting with 
slightly less than 1,300 vessels and 1,200,00 people in 1946 
to slightly more than 400 ships and 400,000 sailors in 1993. 
This represents approximately a 70 percent cut in ship 
quantity and a 67 percent slash in military end strength. 
Actual statistics for the numbers of ships, active duty 
Navy staff, and civilians from FY89 to FY94 with projections 
















Figure 2.  Total Active Duty Navy End Strength vs Number 
of Ships 
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TABLE 1.  FY89 TO FY94 SHIPS AND PERSONNEL 
(NAVY AND CIVILIAN) STATISTICS 
\\\\ FY89 FY90 FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 
#SHIPS 566 546 526 466 436 374 367 367 363 360 360 
#NAVY 593K 580K 570K 542K 510K 472K 442K 426K 408K 398K 394K 
#CIVS 332K 321K 310K 293K 267K 253K 230K 220K 209K 207K 202K 
Note: Data obtained via BUPERS, PERS 2, presentation slides, author 
unknown, on March 24, 1994 at NPS. The numbers for Navy and civilian 
personnel end strengths are in thousands. 
Over the next several years, the fleet of tenders will 
decommission 16 tenders leaving only four ships that will be 
homeported in Norfolk, Guam, Italy and Bahrain.46 With these 
and other retirements of naval vessels, the downsizing result 
is questionable productivity levels from those who survived as 
well as doubts about a traditionally strong U.S. Navy's 
readiness. There are also tough decisions to be made 
regarding what the fleet can or will be able to do while 
maintaining the six-months shore rotation guarantee made to 
sailors. 
D.  THE NAVY'S DOWNSIZING 
The downsizing of the U.S. military, and in particular the 
Navy, is a phenomenon that affects all of society--from the 
46
 John Burlage, "Tender Mercies," Navy Times. August 
15, 1994, p. 12. 
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remaining service members and military commands, their 
families and friends, to the general taxpayer, especially 
those located close to military installations. Such evidence 
is portrayed in the media each time the BRAC Commission meets 
to discuss possible military base closures and when the 
decision is actually made to close them. The effects of BRAC 
on NAVSEA is vividly depicted in Figure 3. From this 
portrayal, 34 of 70 activities are affected with 4 closures, 
10 disestablishments, 18 realignments and 2 transfers. The 
East Coast operations are hurt the most. 
Every instance of another base closure approved by BRAC 
means, at a minimum, a severe decline in the local economy of 
the base identified due to increased unemployment. These 
taxpayers rely on the business that service men and women 
generate, and, in return, much goodwill is generated for 
support of the military institution. 
The military drawdown carries a serious message to 
society: "the military is no longer as important as it once 
was, and those who join may not get the same rewards, 
recognition, status, or security enjoyed by their 
predecessors."47 What once was an institution renowned for 
job training and a place to make "men of boys," is now in the 
throes of uncertainty and instability. "If the military 
downsizes below a certain 'critical mass,■ it may become 
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invisible in the minds of a large segment of the population-- 
potential recruits and their parents."48 
Also, the military faces an uphill battle with Congress 
every time the defense budget is slashed. If the services 
become "invisible" in the minds of the voting taxpayers, then 
it will be very difficult for elected Congress members to 
approve spending their constituents' tax dollars for a 
military no one is aware of or supports. The future defense 
requirements become neglected, leaving a country in a state of 
dangerous complacency. This is one more cause to establish a 
long-term national military strategy. 
Congressional fiscal restraints have been imposed without 
much apparent careful analysis of the long-term repercussions. 
The number of ships that the Navy maintains is not as 
important as is the type of ships needed for the mission-- 
which has yet to be defined due to the pending release of the 
Navy's Forward from the Sea doctrine.49 Without a National 
Defense Strategy clarified, the Navy is being mandated to 
reduce its entire infrastructure further in conjunction with 
patrolling the high seas for various regional conflicts and 
humanitarian causes. 
The people who remain in the Navy, labeled survivors, 
receive second-place attention compared to the statistics of 
48
 Ibid. , p. 22. 
49
 Blazer, loc. cit. 
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the downsizing, referred to as leavers. The leavers receive 
paid bonuses and numerous benefits to exit, regardless if some 
of them planned to leave voluntarily. When the Navy reduces 
its work force, "the survivors are usually seen as winners and 
the casualties as losers; but survivors are often casualties 
of another sort."50 Looking at the millions of dollars the 
Navy spends on the leavers, there is little or no compensation 
given to the survivors who fulfill the same missions with 
decreased resources. This disparate treatment of survivors 
and the lack of resources must be reconciled if the Navy is to 
continue its proud tradition of providing ultimate defense 
readiness. Such a feat requires careful consideration of 
actions before they are taken based on a clear set of 
objectives. 
E.  NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND OVERVIEW 
NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND (NAVSEA) is based in Arlington, 
Virginia, on the edge of Washington, D.C. As the largest 
Naval shore installation, their mission to support the fleet 
is gravely impacted when reductions occur. NAVSEA is a multi- 
dimensional activity with many responsibilities. Figure 4 
identifies the major departments in the self-described NAVSEA 
"corporation" as:  ASN PEOs; Headquarters; Warfare Centers; 





















Figure 4.  NAVSEA Corporate Areas and Functions 
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Naval Ordnance Center; Industrial Facilities; Fleet Commander 
in Chief (FLTCINC) Afloat Maintenance Organization (proposed). 
Each department has several functions specified; however, 
the primary corporate functions are elaborated more succinctly 
in Figure 5. These 22 "Functions and Competencies" are 
dispersed among all of NAVSEA's activities. The ones 
pertaining to Headquarters will be discussed further in 
Chapter III. 
When considering the overall impact of the DON'S force 
reductions in relation to NAVSEA, Figure 6 helps to get a 
perspective of the direct effect. From this diagram of the 
"Force Structure & NAVSEA Manpower Changes," from FY8 9 through 
the end of the century's projections, NAVSEA's civilian 
personnel reductions outpace the required military manpower 
reductions. The Navy's Total Obligation Authority (TOA) 
almost matches the decline in the number of battleforce ships 
during the years identified. 
Looking at the three-year window examined in this thesis 
(FY90-FY93), overall NAVSEA's civilian force is reduced 
approximately 19 percent to the Navy's 23 percent reductions 
in its Battleforce Ships and 22 percent decrease in TOA. This 
suggests a direct parallel between the Navy's cutbacks to 
NAVSEA's overall reductions. 
How NAVSEA Headquarters accomplishes its downsizing edicts 
is presented in Chapter III. 
31 
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Figure 5.  NAVSEA Corporate's Functions and Competencies 
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III.  WHAT DID NAVSEA DO? 
A.  EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT 
Beginning in the summer of 1991, NAVSEA recognized the 
need to be proactive in preparing for its future endeavors 
given the external organization climate that enveloped and 
impacted upon it. 
With the end of the Cold War era well publicized, Congress 
began looking for means to reduce the Federal deficit. Due to 
the shift from global war to regional threats, Congress felt 
justified for imposing greater fiscal restraints upon the 
military.51 There was no disputing the growth of smaller 
centralized concerns such as observed in Kuwait and Somalia. 
With the DoD consuming more than 18 percent (approximately 
$271 billion) in FY89 of the Federal budget and two-thirds of 
discretionary expenditures,  Congress had an obvious target. 
Consequently, under pressure to adhere to the Gram-Rudman- 
Hollings Act (1986 and 1988), the Goldwater-Nichols Act and 
the Budget Enforcement Acts of 1985 and 1987, Congress called 
for massive DoD reductions and program consolidations and/or 
eliminations. Jointness became a key "buzzword" to the 
military leaders in the midst of this mandated drawdown. 
51
 Strategic Transition Plan (STP) Draft Working 
Papers, author unknown, Naval Sea Systems Command, March 19, 
1993, p. 5. 
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The post cold-war downsizing edicts pronounced by Congress 
necessitated reductions in: 
1. Personnel--officers  and enlisted--from all military- 
branches; 
2. The infrastructure--military bases and facilities; 
3. The U.S. Naval Fleet; 
4. Ship maintenance and modernization; 
5. New shipbuilding contracts.52 
While all five had an impact upon NAVSEA, it is the direct 
consequences of the last three that produced the greatest 
managerial nightmare. NAVSEA's entire organization revolves 
around servicing the Naval Fleet to include repairs, 
maintenance, and potential new ships' design and engineering. 
Although this thesis is focused on the Headquarters domain, 
this particular impact must be underscored. 
Additional external events occurred around December 1991 
creating concerns for NAVSEA.  They are: 
1. The new Department of the Navy Review Commission (DONRC) 
formed to study DON'S downsizing to maximize efficiency; 
2. Several OPNAV Reorganizational Teams were created to 
address the forced drawdown and joint efforts now and in 
the future; 
3. The Deputy of Defense called for "reduced presence in the 
National Capitol Region (NCR) as part of the streamlining 
efforts."" 
52




Whenever the Navy is tasked to reduce its force presence 
(especially in the Washington, D.C. area) or decrease its 
fleet, NAVSEA is directly affected as the largest naval shore 
command employing thousands of military and DoD employees. 
Knowing that NAVSEA's hierarchial chain of command flows from 
the Commander-in-Chief to the CNO and how the CNO' s budget 
grows with any recoupment of NAVSEA's OM&N funds, provides a 
richer appreciation for the serious implications of these 
external forces upon NAVSEA. 
B.  INTERNAL DYNAMICS 
NAVSEA recognized that as a "corporation," it was going to 
face increased demands in the future from a myriad of sources 
and wanted to be proactive in its preparation. Thus, it 
established an Executive Steering Group (ESG) to ascertain the 
most productive route for NAVSEA to travel to maintain its 
efficiency. This ESG reviewed the existing organizational 
structure and missions as well as all pertinent business 
activities and analyzed the inherent culture. The process of 
how NAVSEA conducts its business was studied in terms of what 
they do, how they do it, and the customers involved. 
The master plan for downsizing NAVSEA based on their 
initial observations and research is outlined in Figure 7. 
These stages are discussed in the following sections with 
specific Headquarters' actions or strategies highlighted where 
feasible. 
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Figure 7.  Master Plan for downsizing NAVSEA 
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The ESG decided that new strategic objectives were needed 
and that they should identify possible contingencies or 
resistance to implementing the new objectives.54 Thus, when 
NAVSEA received a request in December 1991 from CNO to 
"explore restructuring ideas to support the Fleet and reduce 
costs,"55 it was undaunted. Accepting this challenge, NAVSEA 
redirected the ongoing organizational evaluation by ESG 
towards developing a plan of action. Their efforts yielded a 
plan of action and milestones (POA&M) with strategies, 
tactics, remedies, and timeframes specified. This plan became 
known as the Strategic Transition Plan (STP) and provided 
NAVSEA a "roadmap for achieving the command's vision of the 
future."56 This overall plan concentrated much attention on 
maintaining or improving customer support and, where possible, 
improving the employees' work environment and job 
satisfaction. 
C.  THE STRATEGIC PLAN 
The STP reflected the wisdom of Total Quality Leadership 
(TQL) by incorporating a new mission statement, portraying 
NAVSEA's  vision  of  tomorrow  and  formulating  "Guiding 
Principles" that would govern its method of operations. 
54
 Ibid. , p. 2 
55
 Ibid. , p 5. 
56 Ibid., p.2 
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NAVSEA believes "these statements are important elements to 
provide focus and realign the future organization."57  The 
mission statement begins with the word "our," which supports 
the  TQL philosophy  of  involving  the  employee  in  the 
organization  so  they  feel  a  sense  of  ownership  and 
responsibility.   NAVSEA's new mission statement reads as 
follows: 
Our mission is to transform military requirements into 
naval capabilities through research, development, 
engineering, design, acquisition, modernization, 
maintenance and logistics support of effective ships, 
systems and munitions. This enables our sailors and 
marines to conduct prompt and sustained worldwide maritime 
operations.58 
Once again, the effects of naval fleet reductions on NAVSEA is 
readily apparent as the entire mission relates to fleet 
support. 
The vision statement in the STP "outlines the desired 
future outcome...how it should be viewed by its customers and 
its employees and communicates a common direction to its 
people."59 NAVSEA states:  "Our vision is a top-notched team 
of NAVSEA activities which has the full support and confidence 
of our customers and a deserved reputation for excellence."60 
This concern for its customer base in lieu of imminent 
57








reductions that will inevitably provide less services is 
admirable in addition to more proof of the TQL theory in 
practice. 
Concurrently, the ESG provided eight "Guiding Principles" 
to enlighten the lower echelon staff while committing senior 
management to the ideals set forth. Also, the principles 
related their daily work efforts to upholding the Navy's 
mission.  They are depicted in Table 2. 
TABLE 2.  "GUIDING PRINCIPLES" 
Provide the highest quality ships, systems and munitions 
which are safe, affordable, supportable and delivered on 
schedule 
Listen to our customers and base decisions on best available 
information with full consideration of their impact on all 
concerned 
Treat people with courtesy and respect, provide a safe and 
efficient work environment, foster equal opportunity and 
recognize noteworthy contributions  
Build and sustain relationships based on competence, 
teamwork, career development and the highest standards of 
integrity  
Develop and maintain effective relationships with 
contractors by dealing in an open, fair and cooperative 
manner consistent with law, regulation and public trust 
Ensure effective and responsible use of people, money, 
facilities, equipment and time  
Conduct all activities in an environmentally responsible 
manner   
Achieve total quality through continuous improvement of 
processes and products ^======____ 
Note:  Data obtained from Strategic Transition Plan, p. 4. 
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NAVSEA's philosophy for restructuring stems from the logic 
that "workload-driven organizations which perform similar 
functions. . .are more flexible in reacting to changing business 
conditions."61 As a result, the STP calls for realigning 
Headquarters' core functions, shifting of some non-core 
functions to field activities, and completely discontinuing 
certain other functions. Further internal review revealed 
that NAVSEA HQ's would be greatly strengthened by specifying 
the chain of command's reporting authority and working 
relationships  amongst PEOs and DRPMs and HQ's personnel. 
Headquarters' functional organizations, Program Executive 
Officers (PEOs) and Direct Reporting Manager (DRPMs) as of 
early FY93 are depicted in Figure 8. Note that the numbers in 
parentheses represents the military/civilian employee ratio. 
For example, Headquarters' overall employee composition 
reflects 413 military and 4,212  civilian staff (413/4,212). 
Figure 9 portrays Headquarters' 16 diverse Functions and 
six Competencies in greater detail.62 Of those shown, 
acquisition management support, contracting, engineering and 
61 Ibid., p. 10 
62
 Naval Sea Systems Command, "Ships - Submarines - 
Weapon/Combat Systems, Supporting the Fleet of the 1990s, 
Acquiring the fleet of 2010," author unknown, presentation 
given November 24, 1993. 
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Figure 9.  Functions and Competencies:  Headquarters 
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design, financial management and corporate management are the 
main functions.63 
Furthermore, the STP divides the functions into four 
aggregate categories, as depicted in Figure 10: 
• Headquarters' "core" 
• Research and Development and Systems Engineering 
• Ordnance Support 
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Figure 10.  Current Functional Alignment of NAVSEA 
Headquarters 
63
 Commander, Naval Sea Systems, letter 1200, OPR:0 9B, 
Serial 09B/322, November 09, 1993, p. 20. 
64 STP, p. 15. 
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Headquarters' "core" functions warrants elaboration, as 
they are the most affected by DON'S restructuring effort. 
Prior to any realignment, the "core" responsibilities include: 
• A Central Technical Authority 




• Corporate Management 
• PEO/DRPM Support 
The "core's" end-products are part of the Naval inventory 
of vessels: Aircraft Carriers, Cruisers and Destroyers; 
Submarines; Amphibious Assault Ships; Sealift, Mine Warfare 
and Special Mission Crafts. Additional "core" services are 
rendered for: Surface, Submarine and Mine Warfare Weapons; 
combat systems and expendable ordnance. Research and 
development, purchasing, and life cycle support are also 
provided by Headquarters.65 
The STP is predicated on "business assumptions" determined 
for FY95. These assumptions lay the foundation for the 
drawdown decisions to be made henceforth. There are nine 
65
 "Restructuring NAVSEA Headquarters - Functions and 
Programs," Briefing Material for Maintenance Support Quality 
Management Board, obtained from NAVSEA 09B, author unknown, 
Naval Sea Systems Command Washington, November 18, 1993, p. 
7. 
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assumptions specified; however, only the six in Table 3 
pertain to Headquarters. 
TABLE 3.  NAVSEA BUSINESS ASSUMPTIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
HEADQUARTERS 
1.  Manpower resources will be allocated to valid program 
requirements (funding and operational need); lesser programs 
may be consolidated or canceled.  Valid programs will decrease 
by less than 3 0 percent by FY95  
2. Acquisition program execution responsibility by program 
managers will be more focused (in SYSCOM or PEO/DRPM); Life 
cycle management responsibility will be accomplished in the 
SYSCOM   
3.  Headquarters emphasis will be acquisition program^ 
management.  Remaining functions (logistics, engineering and 
fleet support) may be done in the field  
4.  Technical authority retained at Headquarters.  Top-level 
systems engineering will be headquarters emphasis.  Remaining 
engineering may be done in the field  
5. Declining personnel and financial resources will encourage 
SYSCOM's evolution to smaller matrix support organizations for 
SYSCOM and PEO/DRPM acquisition management  
6. Consequences of personnel funding restrictions (hiring 
freeze/RIF/random attrition) will require re-balancing and 
redistribution of workforce  
Note:  Data obtained from Strategic Transition Plan, p. 7. 
Being very thorough in planning the transition, the ESG 
stipulated several strategic objectives to describe what 
NAVSEA should do to meet their goals. Four of them relate 
primarily to  Headquarters' domain.66  These are: 
1. Design the future NAVSEA Washington organization based^ on 
streamlined acquisition, engineering, and logistics 
functions,  with  full  utilization  of  the  proposed 
66
 Ibid. p. 8-10. 
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"Centers", and streamlined/consolidated business support 
functions. Improve working relationship and 
communications with PEOs/DRPMs by clarifying roles and 
responsibilities. Streamline/consolidate staff and 
business support functions by reducing management layers, 
and eliminating redundant functions and non-critical 
work. 
2. Restructure core operations at NAVSEA Washington to 
strengthen and where possible consolidate engineering and 
acquisition functions. Clarify lines of technical 
authority and accountability and working relationships 
among NAVSEA Washington, in-service engineering agents, 
centers and other field activities. Build on the Warfare 
Center's functional purification efforts by transitioning 
non-core engineering and mature/stable program management 
functions and people to field sites. 
3. Establish an Afloat Maintenance Organization (AMO) close 
to the customers, consolidating waterfront technical 
support and some fleet maintenance and readiness 
functions, as well as the advance of ship maintenance. 
Reorganize the Repair SUPSHIPs into Business Operating 
Centers and integrate them with the Afloat Maintenance 
Organization. 
4. Support and develop a qualified and professional 
workforce to meet the Future NAVSEA Corporation's 
technical and quality requirements. 
The establishment of the AMO (third objective) was viewed as 
a means of consolidating those functions which supported fleet 
maintenance/readiness close to the customers. Some of the 
AMO's responsibilities would include maintaining ships' 
material condition, determining requirements for and 
performing maintenance.67 
To begin the restructuring process, NAVSEA determined that 
it had to identify which functions could feasibly be shifted 
67 Ibid., pp. 16-17 
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to  its  field  activities.    So,  a  proposed  functional 
realignment of the four categories was devised. 
D.  NAVSEA'S PROPOSED FUNCTIONAL ALIGNMENT 
Figure 11 represents NAVSEA's "realignment concept and 
final transformation goal" for FY95.68 As observed in 
comparing it to Figure 10, the proposed changes to 
Headquarters (HQs) are numerous. Whereas HQs had four 
categories--"Core," Research and Development, Systems 
Engineering, Ordnance support and AMO--now there is only a 
Headquarters "Core" category with slight modifications. The 
synopsis below captures the differences of "current" versus 












Proposed  "Core" 
Functions 
*Program Management and 
Support 
♦Systems Engineering with 
Central Technical Authority 
♦Contracts 
♦Comptroller 
♦Logistics & Fleet  Support 
♦Command Support including 
Corporate Management and 
Policy 
♦Peo/DRPM Support 
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Figure 11.  NAVSEA's Realignment Concept and Final 
Transformation Goal, FY95 
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Program Management begins the list, which may designate 
its significance as a primary function.     The Central 
Technical Authority is proposed as a subfunction of systems 
engineering.   Contracts and comptroller functions are now 
distinct and higher in precedence than before.  Logistics and 
fleet support are transferred from the R&D systems engineering 
category to "core" under the alignment.   Command support is 
a new function that includes corporate management and policy, 
which were separate entities.   Lastly,  PEO/DRPM Support 
remained identical to its past stature without any change. 
All of the other headquarters functions were either renamed, 
transferred to other NAVSEA activities, or eliminated. 
From this proposed projection of NAVSEA Headquarters, it 
is clear that more emphasis was placed on streamlining its 
activities in harmony with the Business Assumptions 
aforementioned. To achieve this structural change, 
organizational restructuring was directed by numerous NAVSEA 
Notices and Strategic Objectives, with corresponding actions 
developed to specify the implemental changes required. 
To visualize the changes that NAVSEA made, Figure 8 needs 
to  be  reviewed  with  attention  given  to  the  internal 
departmental codes that identify each area beginning with 
"SEA."   One of the first changes beginning Headquarters' 
reorganization occurred in October 1991 with the establishment 
50 
of a Military Manpower and Personnel Office.69 Designated as 
SEA 09M, the Director had the responsibility for consolidating 
all military personnel matters under one office which would be 
the command's central contact for all officers and enlistees. 
In accomplishing this consolidation, Military Manpower Office, 
NAVSEA 01M2,  relinquished all matters regarding manpower 
issues while SEA OOP, Military Personnel Management Office, 
forwarded all of its personnel responsibilities to SEA 09M. 
This action was undertaken to end redundancy and facilitate 
dialogues between those who were involved with military 
manpower and personnel issues. 
In this department, the following divisions were created:70 
Director, Military Manpower and Personnel Officer 
Military Personnel Specialist (SEA 09MC) 
Military Manpower Services Branch (SEA 09M1) 
Military Personnel Services Branch (SEA 09M2) 
Office of Force Master Chief/Special Programs (SEA 
09M3) 
Office of the Command Master Chief (SEA 09M4) 
Office of the Chaplain (SEA 09M5) 
The Director of this newly organized office would be a pivotal 
reference for future downsizing of Headquarter's personnel as 
part of the Command Staff.  SEA 09MC's responsibilities were 
many; however, two become very critical in force reductions: 
(1) to place military persons throughout Headquarters and 
orchestrate the coordination of officers slated for PEOs and 
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DRPMs positions; (2) to develop the Command personnel action 
plan when downsizing mandates are imposed. SEA 09M1 also had 
several obligations with major ones involving the development 
of the military manpower requirements (with justifications) 
for DoD Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and Future Years 
Defense Program (FYDP) budget planning.   Military Personnel 
Services,  S.EA 09M2.  is  responsible  for  administrative 
requirements such as correspondence, evaluations, and other 
military programs. 
SEA Q9M3,  Force Master Chief,  is an advisor to the 
Commander on morale and all enlistees' concerns--personal and 
professional. Additionally, it provides liaisons with the 
Fleet for potential policy changes and shipboard improvements. 
SEA09M4, Command Master Chief, is involved with internal 
organizational morale and welfare matters and career 
development of the enlisted community. 
SEA 09M5, Chaplain, provides moral and spiritual guidance 
to military members and their families. 
E.  STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES (SOBJ) 
There are six strategic objectives that are devised for 
NAVSEA' reorganization; however, only five are discussed here 
as they pertain directly to Headquarters' functions that are 
either transferred or abolished. 
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1.  Strategie Objective #1 
The #1 SOBJ, Acquisition Program Realignment, states: 
Design the future NAVSEA Washington organization based on 
streamlined acquisition, engineering, and logistics 
functions, with full utilization of the proposed 
"Centers", and streamlined/consolidated business support 
functions. Improve working relationship and 
communications with PEOs/DRPMs by clarifying roles and 
responsibilities. Streamline/consolidate staff and 
business support functions by reducing management layers, 
and eliminating redundant functions and non critical 
work.71 
This SOBJ specifically addresses the interaction 
between and responsibilities of Program Executive Officers 
(PEOs), Direct Responsible Program Managers (DRPMs) and 
NAVSEA. It also delineates the initial Headquarter's 
reorganization. The ASN PEOs and acquisition functions are 
directly targeted. Some of the benefits desired include 
greater efficiency from a streamlined operation with less 
duplication of work effort and improved warfare area program 
and customer support. Where feasible, work is consolidated, 
delegated, or eliminated with respect to the authority 
assigned. 
By implementing this program realignment,  NAVSEA 
expects the PEOs/DRPMs to concentrate on critical programs, 
aligning missions appropriately by their platforms. There are 
two distinct  action phases  for  initiating the program 
realignment in stages. 
71 STP, p. 19 
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a. Phase I Actions 
Slated between June and September 1992, these 
actions established PEOs with specific platforms and weapon 
systems for Submarine Systems, Undersea Warfare, Mine Warfare, 
and Ship Defense. The Submarine Combat Systems, Surface Ship 
ASW Systems and DRPM-Seawolf are disestablished. Only DRPM 
Aegis remains intact. A Strategic Sealift Program Office (SEA 
91) was also developed in July 1992 due to the great exposure 
Sealift received during the aftermath of Operation Desert 
Storm. 
During this phased time, NAVSEA executed several 
policy changes that related to the goals established. One 
such NAVSEA Note pertains to the "Organizational Structure of 
The Corporate Operations Office, SEA 09M. "72 This notice 
established this HQ' s office and its inherent responsibilities 
to include the transfer of current civilian manpower duties. 
SEA 09B was to initiate NAVSEA's "Total Force Management" and 
provide executive counsel for strategic planning and develop 
civilian policies for the projected downsizing within the 
Department of the Navy (DON). 
This corporate operations office is the source for 
all personnel downsizing plans and actions, internal and 
external to the Command.  Consequently, hiring freezes, early 
72
 Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, Notice 5400, 
OPR 09DX/020, June 23,1992, pp. 1-4. 
54 
outs or any reductions in force (RIFs) are coordinated herein. 
Its Director reports to the Vice Commander, SEA 09. 
Another notice promulgated detailed the 
"realignment of the submarine research and development 
function from NAVSEA to DRPM-SSN21 (PMS350) . *'73 This change 
accommodated the April 1992 agreement to centralize key- 
elements of the submarine life cycle community to maximize 
both resource and functional effectiveness. Such a 
consolidated effort was practical as PMS350 was the project 
manager for SECNAV's "new SSN concept design project, 
initiated in February 1991. With the observed growing 
migration from SEA 92R's submarine development program 
emphasis towards the DRPM-SSN21's area, this transfer was 
deemed a logical flow which became effective in July 1992. 
b.     Phase II Actions 
In September 1992, NAVSEA was informed that their 
effort should focus on "program management and execution, and 
strengthening NAVSEA technical matrix support for engineering 
and fleet support of the realigned" PEOs and DRPMs.74 This 
guidance entailed more specific and consolidated delineation 
of technical and functional authority for decision-making 
purposes. 
73 Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, Notice 5400, 
OPR 92M/178, July 23 1992, p. 1. 
74 STP, p. 23. 
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In support of this, the realignment of the Office 
of the Director, Ocean Engineering, Supervisor of Salvage and 
Diving (SEA 00C) was announced in October 1992. The purpose 
was to transfer all of the personnel and functions from SEA 
00C to SEA 91 (Surface Ship Director). With this change, SEA 
91 would be the Federal Government's primary technical 
authority for all salvage, search and recovery operations, at- 
sea hazardous material pollution abatement and more.75 
In May 1993, the Office of Special Assistant for 
NAVSEA Base Structure Matters (SEA 09X) was established due to 
the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) I (1988) and II (1991) 
downsizing actions taken. These actions affected about one- 
third of NAVSEA's field structure and had a definite 
consequence on mission readiness and the subsequent reduction 
of Headquarters' workforce with further cuts projected from 
BRAC III (FY95). The Special Assistant's role was to 
facilitate interlocution with external activities, provide the 
critical direction for formulating future intentions, and 
consolidate NAVSEA's BRAC related financial management. From 
this designation, a NAVSEA Base Structure Working Team (BSWT) 
was authorized to centralized BRAC-related actions and 
determine the most cost-effective methodology for 
accomplishing the targeted reductions throughout the entire 
command to include the field activities.   This proactive 
75
 Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, Notice, Ser 
09B/322, October 1992, pp. 1-3. 
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change instituted functional coordination within its 
hierarchial structure and delineated responsibilities and 
tasks more clearly.76 
More restructuring was ordered in September 1993 
with the disestablishment of the Weapons and Combat Systems 
Directorate (SEA 06) with partial responsibility shifting to 
the Surface Ship Directorate (SEA 91)77 and the Submarine 
Directorate (SEA 92) .78 This change was accomplished only 
after an Engineering Directorate (SEA 03) was designed 
followed by more dispersement of field activity functions to 
appropriate departments. As previous budget reductions 
necessitated that Headquarters control its cost while 
remaining operationally effective, and in alignment with the 
Transition Planning Taskforce, it was deemed prudent to make 
SEA 91 responsible for all surface functions to avoid work 
redundancy. Although several new subdivisions were formed as 
a result of the increased responsibility, the consolidation 
was best suited to SEA 91 's current requirements. 
SEA 92 was better equipped to assume taskings 
related to both in-service submarine combat systems and 
submarine electronic warfare and periscope systems which were 
76
 Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, Notice 5400, 
Serial OPR 09B11/154, May 20, 1993, pp. 1-2. 
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 Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, Notice 5400, 
Serial OPR 09B1/234, September 30, 1993, pp. 1-2. 
78
 Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, Notice 5400, 
October 13, 1993, pp. 1-3. 
57 
germane to PEO-SUB. As such, a new sub-division, Submarine 
Combat Systems Program office, was added to SEA 92. This 
particular shift ultimately allowed the PEO-SUB to concentrate 
on fulfilling the primary mission of program acquisitions. 
Throughout the phases of Strategic Objective 
number one, Headquarters was continuously reviewed to achieve 
a streamlined customer-oriented department. It was to be 
predicated upon an "execution of core functions, and programs 
with current, documented requirements and funding, reduced 
overhead and operating costs through process improvement and 
consolidation of functions where feasible."79 The results of 
the review determined a 30 percent reduction-in-force (RIFs) 
from September 1991 to September 1995. Table 4 reveals the 
decreased projected manning targets (RIFs) including those who 
were functionally transferred to field activities from 
Headquarters. The accelerated reduction in FY94 was purposely 
set to meet the President's $3 billion DoD budget cut. 
TABLE 4.  HEADQUARTERS' PROJECTED PERSONNEL FLOWS FY92-FY95 
BUDGET 
LEVELS 
SEP 91 SEP 92 SEP 93 SEP 94 SEP 95 
FY93 FEDERAL 
TARGET 
4,871 4,487 4,335 3,915 3,63 7 
FY94 
REVISION 
4,871 4,487 4,335 3,791 3,637 
Note: This Table was created from NAVSEA data obtained in the STP, p. 26. 
79 STP, p. 25 
Presidential Executive Order 12839 called for an 
overall government employee reduction of 100,000 civilians (and 
high grade positions) in this projected fiscal window. Internal 
documentation shows that actual civilian workforce reductions in 
Headquarters went from 5,268 in FY89 to 4,474 in FY92 (the base 
year) to 4,019 in FY93. The entire command figuratively reaped 
more than $1 billion from salary cost savings in its total 
downsizing plan from FY89 to FY95.80 With respect to high tenure 
billets (GM-13 to GM-15), NAVSEA generated a total 8.9 percent 
reduction from FY91 to FY93. 
A decision was made at NAVSEA to form a Transition 
Planning Taskforce whose job would be to lead the way in the 
restructuring goals set forth for the future "corporation" while 
looking forward to 5-10 years out. This Taskforce would outline 
a Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M) for each core area in 
accordance with NAVSEA's Business Assumptions previously stated. 
From this consolidation, the Taskforce would also determine the 
cost savings from personnel reductions. 
A Restructuring Advisory Board composed of external 
NAVSEA representatives was formed to provide inputs, advice, and 
constructive criticism of alternatives that the Taskforce submitted 
80
 Commander, NAVSEA letter 12000, Serial OPR:09B, 
Serial 09B/322, November 09, 1993, p. 4. 
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to the Commander.  "The expected outcome of the consolidation and 
realignment planning efforts include: 
• smaller staffs; 
• reduced management layers; 
• reduced process checkpoints and expanded supervisory scope; 
• rationalization of high grade positions; 
• equal or improved timeliness in customer response; and 
• progress toward the reduction target."81 
The Taskforce devised a transformation timeline to 
monitor the completion of Strategic Objective #1.  It is depicted 
in Figure 12. 
2.  Strategic Objective #2. 
The #2 SOBJ states the following:82 
Restructure core operation at NAVSEA Washington to 
strengthen and where possible consolidate engineering 
and acquisition functions. Clarify lines of technical 
authority and accountability; and working 
relationships among NAVSEA Washington, in-service 
engineering agents, centers and other field 
activities. Build on the Warfare Center's functional 
purification efforts by transitioning non-core 
engineering and mature/stable program management 
functions and people to field sites. 
This SOBJ is designed to clarify all of the positions, 
"responsibilities, authorities and relationships among NAVSEA 
81
 STP, p. 30. 
82
 STP, p. 35. 
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Figure 12.  Transformation Timeline:  Strategic Objective #1 
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Headquarters and the Warfare Centers (Surface and Undersea) and 
includes the transfer of non-core work to appropriate field 
sites."83 The most critical determinants of what functions are 
eligible for transfer to the Warfare Center or any other field 
activity are:84 
• accountability and authority for the function; 
• identification as "non-core" headquarters function; 
• appropriateness of the function to the selected field 
activity; and 
• funding for the functions in their new location. 
The lack of funding to accept a new function will not prohibit 
Headquarters from targeting it. Headquarters will not digress from 
its "core" responsibilities as detailed previously. COMNAVSEA 
remains assigned "technical authority and accountability for all 
ships, submarines, craft and their systems, including life cycle 
management" except for those already granted to the PEOs/DRPMs. 85 
The strategic transformation timeline is presented in Table 
5. 
83




 Ibid. , p. 36. 
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TABLE 5.  SOBJ #2 TRANSFORMATION TIMELINE8 
1. Update authority- 
instructions & extend to 
full corporate scope by 
third quarter, FY93. 
2. Identify Phase I 
transfers to the field by 
second quarter, FY92 and 
complete transfer by within 
two years (FY94) .  
3. Identify Phase II 
transfers to the field by 
third quarter, FY93, and 
complete transfers by first 
quarter, FY95.  
3.  Strategic Objective #3. 
The third SOBJ involves Headquarters and the FLTCINC Afloat 
Maintenance organization.  It states: 
Establish an Afloat Maintenance Organization close to the 
customers, consolidating waterfront technical support and some 
fleet maintenance and readiness functions, as well as the 
advance planning of ship maintenance. Reorganize the Repair 
SUPSHIPs into Business Operating Centers, and integrate them 
with the Afloat Maintenance Organization.87 
The purpose of this objective is twofold. The first involves 
the realignment of waterfront technical support and the second 
addresses  the   "intermediate  and  depot-level  maintenance 
availability advance planning."88  The breadth of this measure 
potentially affects over 4,000 people throughout 50 activities. 
36
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The second purpose is important as it is necessary to 
determine the tradeoffs between individual ship repair needs and 
the maintenance costs, which is directly linked to the size and 
productivity of the support infrastructure. As the CNO's 
operational agent and the Manpower and Operations and Maintenance, 
Navy (O&MN) funds claimant, the Fleet Commander in Chief (FLTCINC) 
is the logical centralized point to make these trade-off decisions. 
Expected benefits from this functional realignment will 
result in a cost savings due to producing: (1) smaller and 
responsive direct fleet support and repair determination 
infrastructure; (2) smaller, integrated and more responsive 
advanced maintenance planning arena; and (3) smaller, integrated 
and more responsive contract administration facility to repair 
privately owned ships.89 
Most of the planned milestones to accomplish SOBJ #3 are 
completed by the third quarter in Calendar Year (CY) 1993 with four 
remaining actions completed by the end of CY94. 
4.  Strategic Objective #4 
This objective involves Headquarters and the Industrial 
Facilities Branch with the ultimate goal as consolidation of the 
planning and support functions needed for the most cost- 
advantageous avenue to conduct Navy ship repair and modernization. 
Ibid., p. 45. 
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It reads as follows: 
Reorganize the Naval Shipyards into Business Operating 
Centers. A Business Operating Center (BOC) is an organization 
that serves as a platform for consolidation and streamlining 
of planning and support functions to conduct navy ship 
modernization and repair. Business Operating Centers will 
provide the following: Planning and Estimating; Financial- 
Accounting/Payroll; Engineering; Material Support; 
Business/Workload Management; and Administration-Personnel and 
Training. Centers of Excellence will be established for such 
areas as machine shop, foundry, electronics and calibration. 
The goal is to reduce the cost of shipwork through a 
combination of these actions.90 
The argument in favor of this consolidation is that a BOC 
will provide increased efficiencies to the customers in several 
functions that Headquarters can now stop doing.  Some of these 
functions include: 
* Material Support 
* Planning and Engineering 
* Environmental and Safety 
* Managing Work Execution 
* General Administration and Financial Management 
* Automated Information Systems 
* Training 
* Public works 
It is estimated that a billet reduction between 12 percent to 32 
percent of support functions will be realized from this 
transition.91 
The actions required for this SOBJ were either completed or 
scheduled for completion by September 1992. 
90
 Ibid. , p. 51 
91
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5.  Strategie Objective #5 
This  SOBJ  involves  more  transfers  of  authority  from 
Headquarters to the Naval Ordnance Center in direct response to the 
Secretary of the Navy's request, made 5 January 1993.  The fifth 
objective reads:92 
Consolidate all in-service expendable ordnance functions of 
NAVSEA, NAVAIR, and NAVSUP into a Naval Ordnance Center (NOC). 
Establish Weapons Stations Business Operating Centers as part 
of a Naval Ordnance Center. Make substantial use of Naval 
reservists in the workforce at Weapons Stations. 
This particular objective arose from a Quality Management 
Review Board (QMB) that studied the ammunition maintenance and 
delivery processes to both Navy and Marine Corps customers in 
Operation Desert Shield.  This AMMO Board concluded that:93 
• The various ordnance items are managed by over a dozen program 
managers each of whom has different procedures and processes; 
• The  ordnance  items  themselves  are  managed  differently 
according to their groupings and applications; 
• Different  activities  manage  inventory,  maintenance,  and 
procurement; 
• There is low coordination between acquisition and maintenance, 
and 
• The ordnance management information systems are inadequate. 
The consequences of these findings show that customers must 
basically get the ammunition they need from whatever source is 
possible that they can identify.  This poses a very frustrating 
92
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scenario that can be very dangerous in a war scenario, as well as 
indicates much duplication. 
Thus, it appears as a natural proposal to generate a single 
point of contact to handle all ammunition requests and, logically, 
the Commander, Naval Ordnance Center, is the choice. Given that 
the defense budget is sharply declining, the derived benefits of 
this merger are evident. The incorporation of reservists' training 
will also help reduce costs. 
This proposal remains on the table for consideration and 
future implementation planning. 
F.     NAVSEA HEADQUARTERS-NOVEMBER 1993 
Visualizing all of the changes mentioned above is a 
monumental task. However, Figure 13 shows the resultant 
Headquarters' structural diagram as of November 1993. The key 
observations are the greater specificity in the lower echelons of 
the diagram where previously, as shown in Figure 8, there were 10 
divisions and 5 PEOs/DRPMs.- The current chart reflects the same 
quantities but with different names and corresponding functions. 
Unlike the past, there is a PEO for "Theater Air Defense," 
"Mine Warfare," and the "Aegis Program Manager." The Naval 
Ordnance Center is on line as is the new Naval Ship yard and 
Support Ship Management & Field Activity Support (SEA 07)and 
Engineering (SEA 03). 
With respect to personnel, there are 3,373 civilians and 240 













Figure 13.  NAVSEA Headquarters Structure as of November 1993 
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This is a significant decrease from the previous year's data that 
reflected 4,212 civilians and 413 military present. Although 
Executive Order 12839 dictated an annual personnel reduction from 
FY93 to the end of FY95 of 1.3 percent, Headquarters' planned 
reduction stipulates a 4 percent decrease annually, equating to 815 
civilian personnel departures. These departures warrant greater 
measures than the hiring freeze of 1991 and normal 4-5 percent 
annual attrition generated. Voluntary Separation Incentive 
Payments (VSIP) were accepted by 350 civilians in FY93, which 
helped meet the base target; however, for FY94 and FY95, this 
program alone is insufficient. "Planned realignments of some 
functions and personnel to field activities" are anticipated to 
meet the end strengths projections.94 This measure is commonly 
known as involuntary separations. 
"All organizations and functions within the Headquarters have 
been reviewed for reductions, and all organizations are smaller 
today than in 1989."95 Comparing these downsizing reductions to 
the model of fiscal restraint, similarities or contrasts can be 
observed for future benefits to other Naval managers. Chapter IV 
presents this synopsis after introducing the model in its entirety. 
94
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IV.  NAVSEA HEADQUARTERS COMPARED TO MODEL 
This thesis analyzes the downsizing of NAVSEASYSCOM Headquarters 
using as a base of comparison the model provided in "Phases of 
Recognition and Management of Financial Crisis in Public 
Organization" by L.R. Jones. 
Executive and Congressional budget cuts continue to force 
reductions upon Naval commands. Such actions warrant activity 
Commanders having viable information and/or "tools" at their 
disposal to accommodate change. Documenting the downsizing of the 
largest Naval Command, NAVSEA, in comparison to the predictive 
Jones' model helps to meet this need. 
A.     THE MODEL OF FISCAL RESPONSE 
This model of fiscal stress responses discusses "the manner 
in which public organizations recognize and attempt to manage 
financial crises and prolonged financial stress." The foundation 
of the model lies in three basic assumptions previously stated: 
1. Public organizations employ four non-mutually exclusive 
responses in managing fiscal stress: across-the-board 
reduction, specific program reduction, program termination, 
and program reorganization and consolidation or merger 
2. Significant  centralization  of  authority  characterizes 
restraint responses 
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3. Organizational "smoothing" of reduction over a multiyear 
period accommodates fiscal restraint more effectively than 
quick cuts.96 
The two most prominent retrenchment management choices are 
to increase revenues and to reduce expenditures. The former one 
entails examining current sources of revenues and searching for new 
ones with care in generating political support for increasing 
revenues. The second option espouses "across-the- board reduction, 
specific program reduction, and program-policy merger and 
termination. "97 
The phases of recognition and management of financial crisis 
evolve from an integrative "scenario-based model of financial 
stress-coping methods in time sequence."98 The model contains the 
"errors of generalization, omission and potential inapplicability 
to specific cases and circumstances."99 However, it is useful for 
identifying many of the events that appear to characterize 
financial crisis management in public organizations and may prove 
just as valuable for government organizations as well. Although the 
model portrays what happens beyond the fifth year of restructuring, 
it is still useful in analyzing NAVSEA Headquarters in the two-year 
96
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period from 1991-1993 as further cutbacks were projected beyond 
this window. 
The entire model is presented on the following pages as Table 6. 
B.     MODEL DISCUSSION AND NAVSEA HEADQUARTERS ANALYSIS 
1.  Phases 1-3 
What this model predicts in the first three phases is an 
introductory period of acknowledging receipt of the orders to 
downsize, but really not believing or accepting it. Basically, no 
one pays attention to the promulgated crisis, and, when forced to 
react, only short-term measures are implemented without much 
planning or forethought. Blame is quick when the crisis is finally 
recognized as a real issue that apparently will last longer than a 
year. Then, ad hoc decisions are made to reduce spending to the 
target level stipulated, but not one dollar more. No one 
volunteers to reduce his or her departmental operating budget so 
other programs, generally deemed non-essential, are cut first. 
Such programs are labeled "soft services" and include 
supply/support departmental budgets, reductions in funding capital 
depreciation, and training programs.100 
100 Ibid, p. 55. 
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TABLE 6. PHASES OF RECOGNITION AND MANAGEMENT OF FINANCIAL CRISIS 













Phase Events (under assumption that revenues continue 
to be reduced through phase 7) 
1.  Ignoring that a crisis exists; moderate reductions in 
expenditures; crisis termed "only temporary." 
2.  Short-term across-the-board expenditure cuts made and 
attempts to increase revenue from existing sources 
instituted. 
3. Recognition that crisis may persist for longer period 
(more than one year) ,- casting the blame for causes of the 
crisis; ad hoc "invisible" expenditure reductions (e.g., in 
capital plant maintenance or depreciation funding). 
4. Broader across-the-board expenditure reduction; salary 
and hiring freezes imposed; intergovernmental revenue 
assistance sought, new sources of revenue sought; 
efficiency-oriented program cost studies instituted; 
workload cost measures improved ; "softer" nonessential 
services reduced; mandated programs examined for reduction. 
5. Across-the-board reductions continued, accompanied by 
additional reductions in specific programs; some employee 
layoffs occur; improvement sought in revenue forecasting; 
program and policy evaluation undertaken more seriously; 
unions and employee organizations resist further cuts in 
salary; "hits list" of programs for possible termination 
developed based upon traditional organizational criteria; 
the rumor mill picks up steam and employee tension 
increases.  Employee training and development, staff 
services and non-essential public services reduced further 
or eliminated; borrowing capability weakened or lost; some 





6.  Across-the-board and specific program reductions cause 
more employee layoffs and some job terminations; specific 
programs are terminated with some functions absorbed by 
other units; some employees transfer to other units; 
employee morale and productivity drops,- some skilled and 
highly valued employees seek jobs outside the organization; 
negotiations held over trade-offs between salary reductions 
versus more employees layoffs and terminations; 
organization heads recognize need for better and more 




7.  Further program terminations contemplated or 
implemented; leaders recognize need for longer-term 
strategic planning to integrate program and financial 
strategies; need for restoring some expenditures recognized 
(physical plant maintenance and capital investment, 
employee training); program priorities and decision 
criteria established; consultant assistance sought; revenue 
base and structure analysis begins,- organizational leaders 
use political contacts and leverage in attempt to gain 
revenues or avoid further reductions; credit rating 
weakened; processes developed to improve employee 
participation in program/service delivery planning and 
evaluation; fees, charges, and other discretionary revenues 




8. Development and implementation of long-term program and 
financial planning; organization missions and objectives 
renegotiated; new revenue sources expand revenues to 
balance budget at reduced expenditure level; employee 
layoffs and terminations discontinued,- organization invests 
in market analysis to complement  internal program 
evaluation; pricing policies, service demand changes.and 
segmentation studied, and budgetary strategies examined and 
modified.  Continued austerity conditions accepted; 
reorganization plans considered; credit ratings stabilized; 











9. Implementation of program,   financial  and market  plans; 
reorganization of  functions  and responsibilities 
undertaken;   revenues  and expenditures balanced  for one  or 
two  successive years;   some  service  responsibilities 
eliminated through  contracting out,   privatization and other 
means;   greater  citizen  involvement   in service 
prioritization over long term;   salary increases  instituted 
and  some new employees  hired  in  specialized areas;   attempts 
at marketing new organization missions  and objectives 
undertaken.     Employee productivity and morale  improved; 
confidence   in  leadership  strengthened. 
10. Revenues and expenditures balanced over multi-year 
period;   renewed capability from borrowing  results  from 
improved  credit  rating;   some  old debt  refinanced;   search 
for new  solutions  to  social problems;   development  and 
testing of   "Utopian"   technologies  and  service  approaches,- 
reformulation of   intergovernmental   service  obligations ,- 
intergovernmental   revenue  authority negotiated and  shifted; 
recognition that   some   service  and  revenue problems  will 
persist;   improvements  made   in  integration of  programand 
comprehensive  financial  planning;   citizen 
support   for  organization  improves. 
Note: Data for Table extracted from L.R.  Jones,   "Phases of Recognition and 
Management   of   financial   crisis   in   public   organizations,"   Canadian   Public 
Administration,   pp.   52-55. 
These types of budget cuts usually do not affect the customer 
and are least threatening to an organization still in downsizing 
denial. However, Jones notes that the employees will begin to feel 
demoralized when personnel training and education is eliminated. 
Additionally, when an organization ignores funding maintenance and 
taking depreciation, repair and replacement costs assuredly will be 
greater in the long term, thereby negating any overall advantage 
and making  future  cutback efforts politically more  difficult. 
Recalling what NAVSEA Headquarters did from Chapter III, one 
of the first endeavors involved establishing an Executive Steering 
Group (ESG) to strategically direct the downsizing effort. There 
is   no   evidence   or   data   obtained   that   shows   an   unwillingness   to 
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adjust to the new, albeit reduced, budget constraints. Perhaps 
this is best explained given the time period of observation--1991 
through 1993--with the preceding years indicative of great change 
to come due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold 
War. 
One of the first reduction efforts initiated was immediate 
offerings of early personnel retirement announced in FY91 and FY92 
generating an exodus of 53 0+ civilian personnel--most without 
replacements. As for reducing military billets, 48 officers and 12 
enlisted personnel departed without replacement, creating 
vacancies. Work responsibilities were absorbed by remaining 
personnel--the survivors. There were no forced reductions at this 
juncture; however, as news of further personnel cuts was 
disseminated, people presumably began to seriously consider their 
options and likelihood for job security. This is typical behavior, 
identified from retrenchment research that discusses the fear and 
distrust arising from cutback management. 
2.  Phases 4-6 
These next phases involve serious across-the-board cuts (ABC) 
in program budgets that support the organization better known as 
"smoothing." This methodology includes salary caps, personnel 
hiring freezes or layoffs, or reducing (and possibly eliminating) 
specific services. Companies may choose one or a mixture of these 
options, depending on their organizational philosophy. 
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Those in favor of "smoothing" the effects of the right-sizing 
ABC advocate the equity of evenly reducing everyone's budget, 
relying on normal attrition with gapped billets (i.e., no 
replacements) in addition to strategies implemented in the first 
phases. "Advocates of program termination argue the across-the- 
board strategy weakens organizations throughout and is ineffective 
in that high-demand programs and high-quality personnel are cut the 
same amount as weaker ones."101 
These supporters further maintain that program termination 
dictates advanced planning with priorities well established before 
the company is reorganized rather than a haphazard approach that 
appeases no one. To accomplish this, much information, 
communication, and team work are necessary, which helps reduce 
confusion and fear of the build-down. 
NAVSEA Headquarters did not appear to take straight across- 
the-board cuts, but preferred to initially rely on natural 
attrition coupled with detailed strategic planning for long-term 
survival. They were concerned about the employees and customers, 
as evidenced by the new definition of its mission and future 
vision with various guiding principles established. Headquarters 
was streamlined in an efficient manner, maintaining central 
decision-making authority whereby more functional authority was 
issued to the Program Executive Officers/Direct Reporting Program 
Managers  (PEOs/DRPMs).   This was observed when Headquarters 
101 Ibid., pp. 55-56. 
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established the Miliary Manpower and Personnel Office (SEA 09) in 
October 1991 and eliminated the Weapons and Combat  Systems 
Directorate (SEA 06) in September 1993. 
3.  Phases 7-10 
The last phases of fiscal stress responses involves policy 
and program termination. During these phases, organizations do not 
have accurate program facts to justifiably make choices between 
policy decisions or program termination. Thus, cuts are made using 
the "LIFO" accounting methodology of "Last In, First Out," with 
newest programs cut first. Additionally, this decision time is 
fraught with intense political conflict from the major directors, 
department heads, or key personnel as a potential "hit list" of 
their programs are identified. Such political frenzy is counter- 
productive and needs to be carefully controlled by disseminating 
information on why the reduction is needed and the potential 
consequences of not taking such action. 
As this stage takes Headquarters beyond year three of its 
window, all that can be done is conjecture at this point. Given 
the well- documented projection of NAVSEA's future aspirations, 
there is little doubt that this "corporation" is preparing for, and 
exceeding its downsizing mandates. NAVSEA has adopted the posture 
that it wants to lead the way proactively as future downsizing 
occurs. 
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V.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.     SUMMARY 
This thesis analyzed and documented the downsizing of 
NAVSEASYSCOM Headquarters using as a base of comparison the model 
provided in "Phases of Recognition and Management of Financial 
Crisis in public Organization" by L.R. Jones. 
The Primary research questions were: 
1. Does NAVSEA Headquarters' downsizing parallel that of the 
Jones model? If not, what alternate decision process was 
implemented? 
2. Were drawdown decisions made by central authority? 
3. Were "Across-The-Board" or a "Reduction in Targeted 
Services Programs" or a combination of both implemented? 
Given the window of time that is analyzed here, there is no 
evidence of any initial resistance to Headquarters' build-down 
during 1991--1993. Given that no organization is ideal, an 
assumption is made that, prior to 1991, NAVSEA must have gone 
through a period of disbelief and unacceptance of the RIF as it was 
an unprecedented downsizing era. Accepting this initial 
assumption, then, it is possible to say that Headquarters followed 
the model initially by ignoring the first external indications from 
its environment until mandates were issued. 
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However, once orders were received, NAVSEA Headquarters 
sprang into action. An Executive Steering Group and later, a 
Taskforce, were formed to pave the way to a better organization 
that not only was efficient but looked after its employees' work 
environment and focused upon maintaining or improving customer 
satisfaction. Based on the recommendations of the various 
strategic planning groups, the NAVSEA Commander made the 
recommendations a reality by issuing operating directives for 
command reorganization. 
There were no apparent across-the-board cuts as NAVSEA 
followed a prepared plan of action that was based on logical work 
flows and job assessments. Policies, practices, and programs were 
evaluated and changed according to the most efficient 
organizational advantage. 
The subsidiary research questions included the following: 
1. How  has  NAVSEA  Headquarters  organizational  structure 
(departments and people) changed as a result of budget cuts 
from 1991 to 1993? 
2. How were billets eliminated--by attrition or other 
methodology? 
3. Did NAVSEA develop a long term POA&M for its organizational 
restructure before or after downsizing? 
4. Does the Jones model provide potential guidance for DoD 
activities to effectively utilize in drawdown decisions? 
What notable discrepancies are not addressed by the model? 
In answering the first question, NAVSEA Headquarters executed 
numerous changes in its entire operations. Where they determined 
work was redundant, they eliminated it or authorized only one 
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source as the decision-maker. Their budget base in FY92 was $16.8 
billion and $17.7 billion in FY93. 
Personnel reductions declined to a targeted 4,335 in FY93 
from 4,871 in FY92. This RIF occurred due to voluntary force 
reductions and natural attrition, at first. As billets were 
evaluated as unnecessary or redundant, they were eliminated without 
replacement. As people transferred, vacancies were only filled if 
crucial or the position's responsibilities were absorbed by 
another. 
As documented throughout Headquarters' restructuring, there 
was a detailed plan of action and milestones outlined and visible 
throughout the organization. When actions were completed, they 
were so annotated. Annual reviews were conducted to ensure targets 
were met or exceeded. Major revisions were made to the 
Headquarters Official Operating Instructions, incorporating all 
mandated changes and realignments. 
The model used as a base of comparison here proved to be 
useful in obtaining a synopsis of what to expect in corporate 
downsizing and relates very well to other prominent retrenchment 
theories. However, there are two areas that the model could 
address in greater depth which could provide greater assistance to 
military officers as personnel managers. The first one is the lack 
of emphasis on the survivors left behind to maintain high work 
efficiency or accomplish the same mission with less support from 
management and fiscal allotment. If the stated goal of demassing 
is to increase efficiency, given the resultant decreased employee 
81 
morale, how is this objective to be achieved in such a depressed 
situation? 
Another area that is not addressed is the aftermath of 
shifting responsibilities to field activities as Headquarters did 
in realigning its "core functions." What is the impact to the 
fleet or external agencies who must assuredly distribute their 
increased workload to someone else? When does the re-distribution 
end, and at what cost to the survivors? How can managers expect 
their remaining workers to function at peak capacity when they have 
lost their faith in management and have no loyalty to the firm that 
has siphoned off many of their peers to the unemployment lines? 
B.     RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDIES 
In lieu of these concerns, one major recommendation for 
future study is to assess the psychological impact of restructuring 
upon the "survivors" and the external organizations gaining the 
additional responsibilities. What programs, training, or other 
options are available to regain employee trust and cooperative 
attitude? What can re-motivate these high-quality individuals to 
perform to the level of expectations management needs to make its 
mission? Much emphasis is placed on those who leave--i.e., their 
benefits, severance pay, and retirement annuity--to include job re- 
training, and it is time for the survivors to be better understood 
and appreciated. 
Applying various managerial strategies to downsizing can be 
studied as well.  The most basic recommendation is to attempt 
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talking to people honestly .and putting them and their opinions 
first again. This is not to say that their opinions must be acted 
upon, merely that they are solicited. Having a productive work 
force is critical to the Navy and in stabilizing its reputation for 
mission readiness. 
For those employees whose services are no longer needed, 
programs should be in existence before termination to ease the 
transition to the civilian labor market. This humane gesture may 
also foster some goodwill within the civilian community. Such 
programs could offer a selection of job counseling and resume 
workshops, job training or free educational opportunities to 
develop another marketable skill. 
Currently, "...there is a growing body of psychological 
literature that addresses the impact of interventions on 
outcomes... [such as] financial incentives and benefits, 
outplacement, counseling, training, and communications."102 The 
intervention methods apply not only to those who are displaced but 
to the survivors within the organization as well. Persons 
remaining will have the burden of carrying on the work load often 
without a reduction in the mission requirement and in an 
environment of fear, distrust, and job uncertainty. 
Other measures include allocating resources for training and 
educating "All Hands," and investing in future technology. The 
lack of investment today for developing ships for tomorrow,  could 
Kozlowski, op. cit., p. ix. 
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foreshadow America's inability to cope with future military demands 
if not accomplished.103 
Another recommendation for future endeavors involves 
conducting personal interviews of the Headquarters survivors to 
determine what level of productivity and morale exists as a way to 
investigate the "survivors' syndrome" effect of these massive 
changes and the ones that have been made since 1993. 
C.     CONCLUSION 
NAVSEA's overall organization was mandated to reorganize and 
downsize due to budgetary and personnel cutbacks in the Department 
of the Navy. Headquarters was drastically realigned to meet the 
challenges imposed. The changes that this particular department 
experienced were very methodical and well planned. There were 
grave concerns for the people involved who were either voluntarily 
or, as a last resort, involuntarily separated or transferred. Much 
care was given to specifying clearer lines of authority and 
delegating functions to the lowest level possible as espoused by 
TQL principles. 
Headquarters' reorganization did not identically parallel 
that of the Jones model given the three-year window of observation 
allowed for this thesis. Notwithstanding, NAVSEA thoroughly 
planned its downsizing and did not go through many of the expected 
problems in its initial phases as described in the Jones model. 
103 Blazer, op. cit., p. 13 
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The second to third phases described in the model better relate to 
the choices NAVSEA had in its decision on how to reduce its 
budget. 
Mutually beneficial, cooperative efforts between the private 
sector and the government are more likely to occur in the future as 
the serious political implications for base closures and further 
military lay offs are taken into account. However, once a national 
defense strategy is defined, the new conflicts can be assessed and 
then used to justify continuous military funding to the taxpayers 
and Congress. Ultimately, the U.S. military, including the Navy, 
must be able to maintain its renowned reputation as the world's 
sole superpower. 
Executive and Congressional budget cuts will continue to 
force structural, personnel, and budgetary reductions upon Naval 
commands through FY99 by most projections. As such, the model of 
fiscal restraint responses is useful in encapsulating the 
inevitable problems that accompany changes brought about by fiscal 
reduction. NAVSEA appears to be an ideal model upon which to 
pattern future restructuring efforts, and the Jones model provides 
a useful understanding of how to proceed. 
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